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Abstract in English 
This paper analyses the relative performance and selection behaviour of not-for-profit (NFP) 
job training service providers, using contract data from the Dutch social benefit administration. 
Our analysis takes full account of selection effects, both ex ante (before the contracting process) 
as well as ex post (at the start of the program). First, for each cohort type of unemployed clients, 
cohorts that are contracted are ex ante equivalent for providers that are procured. Thus, within 
cohort type variation in performance outcomes suffices to obtain consistent estimates of 
performance differentials. Second, ex post selection of clients by providers, at the start of 
programs, is measured explicitly in our data. Our estimation results show that FPs are more 
active in selecting clients, both by sending back more of them, and indirectly, by encouraging 
clients to start a program, so as to receive additional (fixed) payments by the social benefit 
administration (per client at the start of a program). Regarding the estimation results for the job 
placement rates, we find NFP job training service providers only to outperform FPs slightly in 
the durability of job contracts. This effect is however too small to lead to overall better 
placement rates. 
 
Key words: welfare programs, non-profits, procurement, selection, effectiveness 
JEL codes:  I38, L31, H57. 
Abstract in Dutch 
Dit paper vergelijkt de prestaties van winstgerichte met niet-winstgerichte re-integratiebedrijven 
(rib’s) voor door UWV aanbestede trajecten. We houden rekening met de effecten van afroming 
− waarvoor winstgerichte rib’s mogelijk gevoeliger zijn − zowel bij de aanbesteding van, als 
tijdens de start van trajecten. Bij de aanbesteding van trajecten door UWV is geen ruimte voor 
afroming, aangezien offrerende rib’s alleen op de hoogte zijn van de globale kenmerken van 
‘kavels’ van WW- en WAO cliënten. Bij de start van trajecten kunnen rib’s wel afromen door 
kansarme cliënten alsnog buiten hun kavels te laten of juist kansrijkere cliënten die twijfelen, 
over te halen toch een traject te starten. Onze schattingsresultaten geven aan dat winstgerichte 
rib’s inderdaad meer afromen bij de start van trajecten, zowel door cliënten terug te sturen als 
door (kansrijkere) cliënten binnen te houden. De plaatsingsresultaten laten verder zien dat 
winstgerichte rib’s alleen iets beter scoren in het verwerven van duurzame banen van cliënten.  
 
Steekwoorden: re-integratie, non-profits, aanbesteding, selectie, effectiviteit 
 
Een uitgebreide Nederlandse samenvatting is beschikbaar via www.cpb.nl.   4 
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Summary 
Similar to hospital services and the education sector, the provision of job training and mediation 
services comes with asymmetric and incomplete information problems. First, if job training 
service providers have an informational advantage on clients, adverse selection or ‘cream 
skimming’ occurs if they concentrate on clients with a priori better job prospects. Second, 
regarding the placement rates and wages of clients into new jobs, particularly the long term 
effects of programs may be hard to contract upon, thus giving rise to moral hazard problems. In 
the literature, it is often argued that not-for-profit (NFP) organisations may act as a response to 
both these types of market failures, as non-profit case-managers are constrained in their ability 
to pursue personal gains and therefore are less susceptive to adverse selection of clients and 
moral hazard with respect to job placement. This mechanism may also be relevant for the 
provision of job training services, with case-managers being driven by equity concerns. 
 
Empirical evidence on the relative performance of FP and NFP job training services is scarce. 
Moreover, usually no formal treatment is presented of the selection process of job training 
service providers. Thus, if selection is important and predominantly confined to FPs, the 
relative performance of NFPs will be underestimated. This paper however, which is based on 
contract data from the Dutch social benefit system, takes full account of selection effects, both 
ex ante (i.e. during the contracting process) as well as ex post (i.e. at the start of a program). 
First, given the setup of the contracting system, cohort types in our data are ex ante 
homogeneous − with job service training providers only being informed on the average 
characteristics of the cohort type. Thus, there is no room for asymmetric information and 
selection effects of individual cohorts within cohort types. Within cohort type variation of 
individual cohorts in terms of performance outcomes of NFP and FP job training service 
providers is thus sufficient to obtain consistent estimates of performance differentials. Second, 
selection effects at the start of the program are measured explicitly in our analysis. As 
contracted cohorts are assigned to a specific job training service provider, clients that 
effectively do not participate in the programs are labelled as selection effects (or: dropouts) with 
respect to clients of a particular service provider  
 
Our estimation results show that FP are more active in selecting clients, both by sending back 
more of them (provider induced selection) and indirectly, by stimulating clients to start a 
program (client induced selection). The higher extent of provider induced selection of FPs 
indicates that they take more advantage of the opportunity to send back clients by excluding 
clients with bad job prospects. This effect is however dominated by the lower rate of client 
induced selection of FPs, causing the fraction of effective participants at the start of the program 
to be lower for NFPs than for FPs. Thus it may well be that FPs are more susceptive to the 
reward incentive per individual client at the start of a program. Regarding the performance of   8 
providers in job placement rates, NFP job training service providers make a small difference for 
the durability of job placements. In particular, we find NFPs to have a job placement rate in 
terms of contracts of at least twelve months that is 1.6 to 1.8%-point higher than FPs. For the 
overall job placement rate, however, no significant and systematic differences are found.  
 
We conclude that FP and NFP job training service providers have different performance 
outcomes, particularly regarding their selection behaviour. For the social benefit administration, 
however, the conversion from these findings to policy implications is complex. If the contractor 
aims at maximising the fraction of clients that participates in programs as an equity device, FPs 
are to be preferred, as the overall fraction of assigned clients that participates is higher than for 
NFPs. From an efficiency point of view, however, maximising the number of clients that 
effectively participates may not be a wise thing to do. Additional clients may be less motivated 
to participate or would have found a job anyhow. Our results indicate some evidence in this 
direction − that is, clients not showing up at the start of a program have higher re-employment 
rates than participants. Given the current setup of our analysis, however, we cannot infer 
whether this finding reflects higher a priori chances to find a job, or whether programs lower 
the probability to find a job. We leave this for future research. 
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1  Introduction 
Similar to hospital services and the education sector, the provision of job training and mediation 
services comes with asymmetric and incomplete information problems. The public sector, who 
is the major contractor of job training service providers in most OECD countries, is therefore 
confronted with both (adverse) selection and moral hazard problems. First, if job training 
service providers have an informational advantage on clients, adverse selection or ‘cream 
skimming’ occurs if they concentrate on clients with a priori better job prospects. Second, 
regarding the placement rates and wages of clients into new jobs, particularly the long term 
effects of programs may be hard to contract upon, thus giving rise to moral hazard problems. 
Job training service providers may aim at job placement in the short run, while ignoring the 
durability of these jobs. 
 
It is often argued that not-for-profit (NFP) organisations may act as a response to market 
failures in the provision of public services (Hansmann, 1980). Regarding the provision of job 
training services, non-profit case-managers are constrained in their ability to pursue personal 
gains and therefore are less susceptive to adverse selection of clients and moral hazard with 
respect to job placement. Moreover, the very lack of residual claimants or profit motives 
provides a valuable commitment to employees that are intrinsically motivated to provide better 
services (see e.g. Francois, 2000). Thus, if NFPs succeed in attracting these employees, this 
gives them an advantage with respect to FP service providers. In particular, if NFPs receive 
donated labour, they may produce at lower costs, provide higher quality, or focus on market 
segments that are less profitable. This mechanism may also be relevant for the provision of job 
training services, with case-managers being driven by equity concerns (see e.g. Heckman et al., 
2002). 
 
Various empirical studies, particularly focussing on the hospital industry, have tested whether 
NFPs indeed make a difference (see e.g. Eggleston et al., 2006). Empirical evidence for job 
training services is however scarce. Major exceptions are Heinrich (2000) and Stoll et al. 
(2003), who investigate whether NFP job training providers make a difference in their selection 
behaviour and the placement into jobs. Heinrich (2000), who analyses 637 local service 
providers of JTPA activities, finds no evidence for systematic differences in the selection of 
client types between the organisation types. Moreover, FPs have higher job placement rates 
than NFPs at the moment of termination of a program, but these differences do not persist in the 
long run. Stoll et al. (2003) present some evidence for adverse selection, as non-profit CBO’s 
(Community Based Organisations) in Boston train participants with more ‘barrier 
characteristics’ than other organisations. Similar to Heinrich, Stoll et al do not find CBOs to 
outperform FP organisations systematically in terms of job placement rates. 
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One of the key aspects the above studies is the role of selection by job service training 
providers. Usually no formal treatment is presented of the selection process of job training 
service providers. Therefore, high job placement rates can simply be due to the fact that 
providers select clients with high a priori job prospects, and reverse. This choice is often led by 
data considerations. In particular, US job training service providers have discretion in the (ex 
ante) choice of their clients, causing room for cream skimming. In the abovementioned studies, 
several controls are used for observed differentials in the client composition of FPs and NFPs, 
while leaving unaddressed the biasing impact of unobserved characteristics, such as the 
motivation or the health of clients. Thus, if selection is important and predominantly confined to 
FPs, the relative performance of NFPs will be underestimated. 
 
In this paper, we contribute to the literature by analysing both the relative performance and 
selection behaviour of NFP job training service providers. In the empirical analysis, we take 
explicit account of the selection process of clients, both in the allocation of clients prior to 
programs, as well as at the start of programs. We use contract data from the Dutch social benefit 
administration, which is the major contractor of job training service providers in the 
Netherlands. For various client cohorts that have been contracted out over the period 2002-
2005, we observe the job training service provider, its legal status (FP or NFP), the actual 
region the cohort is located, the contracted cohort size, the effective number of program 
participants and their job placement rates. With these data, we are able to obtain consistent 
estimates of performance differentials between FP and NFP job training service providers, both 
in terms of (adverse) selection and job placement rates. We argue that we take full account of 
selection effects, both ex ante (i.e. in the allocation of clients to providers) as well as ex post 
(i.e. the sample of clients that starts the program). 
 
First, the social benefit administration procures various client cohorts that are defined by 
specific client or cohort types (e.g. older workers, immigrants or lower educated) and/or 
specific program types that have to be followed (e.g. job training, mediation or self-
employment). For each cohort type, multiple cohorts are procured to job training service 
providers. From the perspective of job training providers, these cohorts are ex ante 
homogeneous, i.e. the actual clients that will follow the program are not known when providers 
are awarded with contracts. Instead, providers will only have (limited) information on the 
average characteristics of the various cohort types. We therefore argue that the within cohort 
type variation of client cohorts in the performance outcomes of NFP and FP job training service 
providers is sufficient to obtain consistent estimates of performance differentials. When 
estimating our model, we therefore include cohort type fixed effects, as any selection within 
cohort types is basically ruled out by the contracting system. 
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The second innovative aspect of the paper is that (ex post) selection of clients at the start of 
programs is measured explicitly in our data. As contracted cohorts are assigned to a specific job 
training service provider, clients that effectively do not participate in a program can be 
interpreted as ex post selection effects with respect to clients to a particular service provider. 
Selection can be attributed to the job training provider itself (‘provider induced selection’) − i.e. 
they may send back some clients to the social benefit administration when they consider these 
not to be suitable for the program. Selection effects may also stem from individual clients for 
whom their reintegration plan has not (yet) been approved by the social benefit administration. 
In the empirical analysis, we test whether these types of ex post selection differ between NFPs 
and FPs. Moreover, as ex post selection may indirectly affect the average performance of the 
(remaining) clients on the program, we also use these variables as (additional) controls when 
estimating models for the job placement rates. If adverse selection is important, we may expect 
the performance of job service training providers to increase with respect to the number of 
clients that are returned to the social benefit administration.  
 
In what follows, we first explain the Dutch institutional context and the contract data in section 
2. Section 3 describes the empirical strategy followed, as well as the estimation results. Finally, 
section 4 concludes.  
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2  Institutional context and data 
2.1  The contracting process 
In the Netherlands, the Disability Insurance (DI) and Unemployment Insurance (UI) scheme are 
mandatory for all workers. Both of these schemes are carried out by the (public) social benefit 
administration. Similar to the New Deal in the United Kingdom, unemployed clients − also 
those receiving Social Assistance benefits − should be offered mediation, job training or 
subsidised employment within twelve months after the start of the benefit spell. This holds both 
for UI recipients and DI recipients that have residual income capacity.  
 
As of 2002, the Dutch social benefit administration contracts out the delivery of mediation and 
job training services to private job training service providers only. In the period under 
investigation (2002-2005), this was done by the procurement of various cohort types. For each 
cohort type, multiple cohorts with individual clients were contracted to job training service 
providers. For instance, in 2002 there were 53 cohort types and 474 individual cohorts that were 
contracted. During the contracting process, the individual clients within a particular cohort were 
not known yet by the provider – they were only informed on the average characteristics of the 
cohort types, the expected cohort size, and contract conditions. When contracts were awarded to 
a provider, however, the client addresses were transferred to the provider, who in turn had to 
contact the clients and make a reintegration plan. This plan includes a list of proposed activities 
to get the client back to work, as well as the rights and duties of the provider and the client. In 
order for the program to get started, the reintegration plan has to be approved by the social 
benefit administration. In practice, reintegration plans are not formulated for all individual 
clients, or are not approved in all cases. Thus, there is a distinction between the ‘gross’ cohort 
that has been assigned to a provider on the one hand, and the ‘net’ cohort of clients for which 
reintegration plans are submitted and approved by the social benefit administration. 
 
Over the years, the exact number of cohort types has decreased substantially (from 53 cohorts in 
2002 to 17 in 2005). These types can be characterised by (combinations of) (i) specific client 
target groups; (ii) program types; (iii) impairment types; and (iv) the sectors where unemployed 
clients formerly were employed. The most prominent client groups include immigrants, clients 
with ‘substantial re-employment probabilities’, older workers and school leavers or dropouts. 
Relevant instrument types that have been used are job training, job hunting or self-employment. 
Further, in about one fifth of the cohorts service providers opted for specific DI recipient 
categories, like those with ‘mild’ impairments, mental impairments, visual and hearing 
problems, behavioural problems and pregnancy related impairments. Finally, only a small group 
of contracts consisted workers that try to find a job in another sector (mostly the care sector) 
than the one they were previously employed.   14 
Table 2.1  Sample averages for contracted cohorts, 2002-2005 (st. errors of averages between brackets) 
  2002  2003  2004  2005 
         
# Procured cohort contracts  474  292  339  312 
# Cohort types   53  20  17  17 








# Clients (gross)  106,156  88,153  65,111  24,149 
         
Trajectory duration (days)         
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In the bidding process, the relevant criteria were the proposed and past performance, the price, 
experience with the specific cohort type and the ‘need for their proposed services’. Thus, 
criteria were mostly of a subjective nature and the legal status of job training service providers 
was not taken into consideration. At the end of each quarter, the social benefit administration 
chose the service provider that satisfied these criteria the best. Next, contracts with the job 
training providers were formalised. The payments per program ranged between 2,500 and 4,000 
euro (De Cuyper et al., 2005) and were partly related to job placements. Typically, the reward 
per client consisted of a fixed payment when the reintegration plan was approved (20% at   15 
maximum), a fixed payment six months hereafter (40-50%), and bonus payments in case of job 
placement in jobs for at least two and six months (40 to 50%).
1 
 
2.2  The contract data 
Table 2.1 shows sample statistics of all cohorts that have been contracted out to job training 
service providers from 2002 to 2005. In total, there were 107 cohort types, 1,417 contracted 
cohorts, 283,569 clients that started job training programs and 105 job training service 
providers that have been contracted. Thus, there were about 13 individual contracts per cohort 
type on average. Usually contracts start in the quarter after the bidding and awarding process, 
and the actual programs formally end twelve months afterwards. Individual groups of clients 
may start their program at various moments, mostly starting in the first weeks the contract has 
started, but in principle within the same quarter.
2 For each year, a new classification of cohort 
types was used by the social benefit administration, amounting to 53 types in 2002 and 17 types 
in 2004 and 2005. In the contract data, multiple contract observations do not reflect yearly 
variation. Instead, the panel aspect of the data is that we observe multiple cohort contracts per 
cohort type for separate years, with within variation stemming from multiple regions and 
service providers per cohort type. We return to this issue in the next section. 
 
In our sample, the number of clients that follows job training programs decreased substantially 
over the years, particularly in 2005. It should be noted however that this drop reflects the fact 
that contract outcomes in 2005 are not fully recorded by December 2005, which is the reference 
date for all contracts in our data set. Similarly, contracts that started in 2005 that have not been 
completed yet by the time of recording cause the average trajectory duration for clients that 
have not found a job (yet) to be incomplete (and therefore underestimated) as well.
3 In the 
preceding years, the average trajectory duration of (successful) clients that found a job was 
between 200 and 280 days, whereas the average contract duration for unsuccessful clients 
varied between 394 and 539 days. 
 
For each contract, observed cohort characteristics are the specific region for the bidding process 
(7 in total), the job service provider and its legal status (FP or NFP), and the benefit scheme of 
cohort clients (UI or DI). The share of cohorts with DI recipients ranged from 51 to 67% over 
 
1 For the shortest program trajectories, payments included only a fixed payment when the reintegration plan was approved 
and a bonus payment for individual clients that have found a job for at least two months. 
2 This means that the cohort that participates in the scheme exists of ‘sub-cohorts’ that start at different moments in time, but 
with similar contract conditions and job training service providers. For these 1,417 contracts, we observe 9,173 ‘sub-cohorts’ 
that have started their program at different dates. Thus, there are 6,7 sub-cohorts per contract. We do not observe the 
starting dates of these sub-cohorts, so aggregating the data to the level of contracts does not give any loss of information. 
3 As we will estimate model versions with cohort type fixed effects and we have new cohort types for separate years in our 
sample, any underreporting errors for job placement rates in 2005 will be controlled for. We return to this issue in the 
empirical implementation of our model.   16 
the years. NFP job service providers covered 3 to 7% of the contracted cohorts in 2002-2004, 
whereas their market share is negligible for 2005. Although the market share of NFPs is small, 
we argue that the absolute number of contracts (55) as well as the number of clients in these 
contracts (5,532) is sufficiently large to obtain representative estimation results (see table 2.2). 
Furthermore, there is a sharp drop in the average cohort size in 2005, both in the number of 
clients that are ex ante assigned to job training service providers (i.e. the ‘gross’ cohort size) 
and the number of clients that have effectively started their trajectory (i.e. the ‘net’ or ex post 
cohort size). 
 
Basically, the social benefit administration assesses the outcomes with two measures: provider 
induced selection and job placement rates – both into jobs with contracts of at least six and 
twelve months, respectively. Regarding the first outcome measure, job training service 
providers may send back some clients if they consider these not to be ‘suitable for the program’. 
We define the fraction of these clients of the total contracted cohort as provider induced 
selection. Obviously, high provider induced selection is not in the interest of the social benefit 
administration, as these are associated with cream skimming. Therefore, high provider induced 
selection rates diminish the prospects of future contracts.
4 Next to provider induced selection, 
we define client induced selection as clients that effectively do not participate in programs, but 
which are not sent back by the service provider. This group consists of clients that either 
already have found a job by the time the trajectory starts, or for whom the reintegration plans 
have not been approved by the social benefit administration anyway. In both cases, clients are 
no longer assigned to their respective job training service provider, and this does not affect the 
future prospects of contracts. Unfortunately, there is no information on the size of these two 
categories. 
 
Over the years, there has been a downward trend in provider induced selection, from 3% in 
2002 to only 1.3% in 2005. This contrasts with the evolution of client induced selection, which 
has risen from 13% in 2002 to 25% in 2005. Job placement rates, which are measured one year 
after completion of the contract at maximum, seem to have decreased over the years, 
presumably as a result of the economic downturn in 2003 and 2004. This holds both for job 
placements in the first six months after the program and the next six months. Again, however, it 




4 In the contracting process, past provider induced selection is one of the criteria for the awarding process, but not in an 
explicit fashion – for instance by setting maximum standards.   17 
Table 2.2  Comparison between FPs and NFPs (2002-2005): cohort characteristics and performance 
  For profit  Non profit 
     
# Procured cohort contracts  1,359  58 
# Job training service providers  92  15 
# Clients (gross)  278,037  5,532 
     
Cohort characteristics     












Performance indicators     








     












     
Trajectory duration (days)     









Significance of any differentials between the sample averages of FPs and NFPs is denoted by *, **, and *** at 10%, 5% and 1%, 
respectively. 
 
Table 2.2 shows average values of our sample of cohort contracts, stratified according to FP and 
NFP job training service providers. Only about 4% of our data consists of observations of NFP 
providers, which predominantly serve smaller cohorts with DI recipients.
5 In sum, 15 NFP job 
training service providers were awarded with contracts in 2002-2005, serving 55 individual 
cohorts and 25 cohort types. As four of these cohort types were served by NFPs only, we have 
21 cohort types that can be characterised as ‘mixed’, in the sense that both organisation types 
were awarded with contracts here. Table 2.2 also shows that provider induced selection is 
significantly lower for NFPs than for FPs, whereas the job placement rate is higher for NFPs for 
durable job placements (more than twelve months) only. It is however unclear whether these 
 
5 When regressing the contracts share of NFP job training service providers on cohort type characteristics, we find cohort 
types with DI recipients and with smaller size to have significant coefficient values. No significant effects are found when 
including the average job placement probability of the cohort type as an explanatory variable. Thus NFPs seem to specialise 
in DI clients and smaller cohort groups, rather than those with bad job prospects.   18 
differentials are related to job service training providers, or the (ex ante) selection of cohort 
client characteristics. For this, a more formal research design is needed. 
 
Table 2.3  Variance decomposition of performance indicators of individual contracted cohorts 
  Cohort types   Service providers  Residual 
       
Selection: provider induced  7%  32%  61% 
Selection: client induced  21%  31%  48% 
       
Fraction employed:   69%  15%  16% 
- Contracts 6-12 months  68%  8%  24% 
- Contracts >12 months  37%  24%  39% 
 
To get more insight into the respective roles of the client types (i.e. cohort types) and job 
training service providers, table 2.3 finally presents a decomposition of the observed variance of 
the performance indicators. Clearly, the role of providers is most prominent for provider and 
client induced selection (32% and 31%, respectively). The latter finding may be surprising, as it 
suggests client induced selection is (indirectly) driven by the job training service providers as 
well. We return to this issue when discussing the estimation results of the selection model in 
section 3.2. For job placement, however, the picture is reversed. In particular, the overall job 
placement rates are strongly determined by the cohort type (69%), whereas only 15% of the 
variance is attributed to individual service providers. Thus, we need to control for cohort 
characteristics (or dummies) to obtain estimates of FP-NFP differentials that can be attributed to 
legal status only. 
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3  Empirical strategy and estimation results 
3.1  Empirical strategy 
Within the context of the bidding process, job service training providers may bid for cohort 
types that they consider most profitable. This means that there is room for selection between 
cohort types. As providers have no additional information on the composition of individual 
cohorts for each cohort type during the bidding process and there is no informational advantage 
vis-à-vis the social benefit administration, there is however no room for selection effects within 
contract types. Thus, ex ante selection effects of job service training providers (i.e. before the 
start of training program) can be effectively controlled for by the inclusion of cohort type fixed 
effects. We can identify the effect of legal status on performance using variation within cohort 
types. As performance measures are fractions in all cases, we thus start by formulating a linear 
probability panel model with cohort types as relevant units: 
 
Pijtr   =  α  Xijtr + β  Yit  + γit  + εijtr            (1) 
 
with i = 1 .. I ; j = 1 .. J ; t = 1 .. T and r = 1 .. R.   
 
In the above equation, we define Pijtr as the performance outcome of job service training 
provider i , with a contracted cohort type j at time t (in years) in region r. Performance can 
either be measured in terms of provider or client induced selection (section 3.2) or job 
placement rates (section 3.3). Matrix X consists of explanatory variables that vary over the 
contracts in our sample. These include the legal status of contracted providers, six regional 
dummies, and the log values of cohort size. The vector α describes the effects of these variables 
on the performance outcome. Matrix Y includes observed variables that only vary across cohort 
types in our sample. These are the type of benefit recipients in the cohort (UI or DI) and the 
years that the contracts start (2002-2005). β denotes the impact of these variables. Finally, γit 
represents the cohort fixed effect and εijtr a residual term that is i.i.d. with an expected value of 
zero and variance σ
2. 
 
When using standard FE estimation techniques for equation (1), not all coefficients describing 
the effects of our parameters can be estimated. As variables in Y do not vary within cohort 
types, we cannot separately identify β and γit . We therefore introduce the parameter vector δ 
and define it as 
 
δ it    =  β  Yit  + γit                (2) 
 
so that equation (1) can be rewritten as   20 
Pijtr   =  α  Xijtr  +  δit  +  εijtr            (3) 
 
and estimated with FE, using cohort types as fixed effects. Thus, we obtain consistent estimates 
of α, but the value estimates of δ cannot be interpreted as cohort type effects in a narrow sense. 
 
The use of FE estimation techniques provides us with a consistent coefficient value of the NFP-
dummy. Still, we should be aware that in this design all contracts are weighed equally, 
regardless their size. Individual clients have a higher probability to be part of contract 
observations with large cohorts than for smaller ones, so equal weights for all observations may 
be misleading. As a check on the robustness of our results, we therefore will also estimate 
equation (1), but now using cohort size of the contracts as relative (analytic) weights. Moreover, 
rescaling the data according to cohort size may also increase the efficiency of our estimates. 
Within the context of FE estimation, however, rescaling is cumbersome, since observed weights 
are not constant within cohort contracts. We therefore follow Mundlak (1978), who proposes a 
specification for fixed effects with pooled data. In particular, we re-specify the cohort specific 
effect as  
 
δ
* it   =  α
*  Xit  +  υit                (4) 
 
where Xit are the average values of observed contract characteristics (i.e. the legal status, 
regional dummies, and cohort size) within cohort i at time t. υit  is a residual term that is i.i.d. 
with an expected value of zero and variance τ
2. Essentially, in equation (4) we include variable 
averages over the observations within the cohort type sample, so as to estimate the parameter 
values α using within variation only. As Mundlak (1978) shows, using this approach on pooled 
data yields estimates that are equivalent to those with FE estimation – at least for those 
variables with variation within cohort types. In the Mundlak model, we can also include Y, but 
consistency is not warranted here as there is no within cohort variation: 
 
Pijtr   =  α  Xijtr  + β  Yit  +  α




φijtr    =   υit  +  εijtr               (6)  
 
where φijtr  is i.i.d. with a mean value of zero and a variance equal to σ
2 + τ
2. This equation can 
be estimated by Generalised Least Squares (GLS), allowing for cluster specific variation and 
cohort size as relative (‘analytic’) weights. Thus, we obtain consistent estimates of our 
parameters of interest with different relative weights, but still exploiting the panel aspect of the   21 
data. In the next subsection, when estimating the model for the service provider selection and 
the job placement rates, we will therefore present both the FE and Mundlak estimates.  
 
3.2  Estimation results: selection 
Table 3.1 presents the estimation results for both the FE and the (weighed) Mundlak model − 
i.e. equations (3) and (5) − for provider induced selection, client induced selection, and the total 
(sum of provider and client induced) selection of clients at the start of a program, measured 
over the time period 2002-2005.
6 We first address the model estimates for provider induced 
selection. Providers may take advantage of the opportunity to send back clients − at least to a 
certain extent − by excluding clients with limited job prospects only that are less profitable in 
terms of payments per job placement. As the table shows, for both the FE and the Mundlak 
specification we find FP service providers indeed to show (significantly) higher provider 
induced selection, with estimated differentials ranging from 0.6 to 0.8%-point (with an average 
rate equal to 2% in the total sample).  
 
More strikingly, we find reverse (and positive) effects of the NFP status for client induced 
selection. In particular, the fraction of clients that choose not to participate in the programs is 4 
to 4.5%-point higher for NFP job training service providers. This effect dominates provider 
induced selection, causing the total fraction of clients at the start of the program to be even 
lower for NFPs than for FPs as well. In a way, this finding is surprising, as the selection 
behaviour of clients is driven by the legal status of service providers. We therefore suspect FP 
service providers to affect selection in an indirect manner, namely by taking more effort in 
preventing clients not to show up at the start of a program, in particular by contacting them as 
early as possible and subsequently get the reintegration plans approved. In this respect, one 
should take in mind that providers are paid by the social benefit administration per individual 
client, both at the start of a program and the moment of job placement. This contract design 
creates incentives to prevent client induced selection by the job training service provider. FPs 
may be more susceptible to this, particularly when additional clients also have good job 
prospects and therefore the probability of job placement rewards is high as well.  
 
One interpretation of the results on provider and client induced selection may be that these are 
substitutes – i.e. a higher proportion of approved reintegration plans results in a higher return 
rate that is induced by the providers. When looking at the correlation between client and 
provider induced selection, however, there is no evidence pointing in this direction. In 
particular, the observed correlation is insignificant and equal to 0.039 (0.027), whereas the 
 
6 We already argued in the previous section that job placement observations of 2005 contracts are susceptive to 
underreporting bias, as the time frame of individual programs was not always complete by the time the data were registered 
(in 2006). Therefore, we also estimated all model forms of sections 3.2 and 3.3 without 2005 as a robustness check. This 
yielded estimation results that were virtually equivalent for the complete time span for all relevant parameter values.   22 
correlation that is observed within cohort types and regions is 0.048 (0.027). From this, we 
conclude there is no strong evidence for substitution effects.
7 
Table 3.1  Estimation results: provider and client induced selection model (2002-2005); standard errors 
between parentheses, N = 1,417.  
  Provider induced selection  Client induced selection  Overall  
             
  FE  Mundlak  FE  Mundlak  FE  Mundlak 
             
Non-profit (dummy)   − 0.0077* 
(0.0039) 










             
DI cohort (dummy)    0.0066*** 
(0.0018) 
   − 0.0014 
(0.011) 
  0.0052 
(0.012) 
Cohort size (gross), log  0.0011 
(0.0031) 








 − 0.037 
(0.038) 














             
F-test regional dummies  P = 0.000  P = 0.000  P = 0.000  P = 0.000  P = 0.000  P = 0.000 
             












Year = 2003    − 0.0065*** 
(0.0022) 
  0.034*** 
(0.012) 
  0.028* 
(0.014) 
Year = 2004    − 0.014*** 
(0.0024) 
  0.061*** 
(0.013) 
  0.047*** 
(0.014) 
Year = 2005    − 0.017*** 
(0.0023) 
  0.11*** 
(0.012) 
  0.097*** 
(0.012) 
             
Average values (per cohort)           
Non-profit    0.0031 
(0.0084) 
  − 0.080** 
(0.036) 
  − 0.076* 
(0.040) 
Cohort size, log    − 0.00065 
(0.0059) 
  − 0.10*** 
(0.030) 
  − 0.10**** 
(0.032) 
Cohort size, log 
squared 
  0.00051 
(0.00064) 
  0.011*** 
(0.0032) 
  0.011*** 
(0.0034) 
             
F-test regional dummies 
(averages) 
  P = 0.094    P = 0.524    P = 0.485 
             
R-squared    25.9%    29.1%    23.2% 
% variance due to FE  28.9%    41.6%    38.4%   
             
Significance of parameter estimates is denoted by *, **, and *** at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
 
7 It may also be that substitution effects do exist, but complementary effects are of equal size. For instance, client cohorts 
that are harder to serve may both have less reintegration plans approved and be more likely to be send back by the 
provider.    23 
Regarding the other parameters in our model, we find the yearly and regional dummies to be 
significant. Over time, the fraction of provider induced selection has decreased substantially, 
whereas the opposite has occurred for client induced selection. One explanation for this may be 
that business cycle conditions have improved in the time period under investigation, causing the 
number of clients finding a job in the time span before the program to have increased as well. 
Furthermore, for the impact of cohort size on client induced selection, we find clear differences 
between the FE and Mundlak specification. This well may reflect the fact that the FE estimates 
are not heteroscedasticy consistent. In particular, the cohort size of the contracts is the prime 
cause of heteroscedasticity. Thus, the coefficient value of this variable is likely to be susceptible 
to heteroscedasticity bias. 
3.3  Estimation results: job placement rates 
So far, our estimates suggest that NFP and FP job training service providers differ in their 
selection behaviour at the start of the programs they provide. FPs are more likely to apply 
provider induced selection, but also provide more effort to prevent clients not to show up at the 
start of a programs and have the reintegration plans approved, so as to ensure (at least) a fixed 
payment per client and to maintain the prospect of future payments in case of job placement. In 
order to test for the possible impact of these selection effects on the job placement rates, we 
now extend equations (3) and (5) with both provider and client induced selection as explanatory 
variables. Table 3.2 presents the resulting coefficient estimates that follow from such an 
approach, again both for the FE and the Mundlak specification.    24 
Table 3.2  Estimation results for job placement rate model, 2002-2005: overall, short and long term 
(standard errors between brackets) 
  Outflow contracts 6-12 
months 
Outflow contracts > 12 
months 
Overall outflow rate 
             
  FE  Mundlak  FE  Mundlak  FE  Mundlak 
             












             
DI cohort (dummy)    − 0.066*** 
(0.020) 
  − 0.0046 
(0.0063) 
  − 0.071*** 
(0.025) 





















































             
F-test regional dummies  P = 0.004  P = 0.005  P = 0.043  P = 0.000  P = 0.019  P = 0.004 
F-test: client = provider 
induced selection 
P = 0.701  P = 0.077  P = 0.524  P = 0.337  P = 0.993  P = 0.067 
             












Year = 2003    0.018 
(0.033) 
  0.0085 
(0.0092) 
  0.027 
(0.040) 
Year = 2004    − 0.0051 
(0.062) 
  0.0044 
(0.018) 
  − 0.00074 
(0.078) 
Year = 2005    − 0.12* 
(0.062) 
  − 0.037** 
(0.018) 
  − 0.16* 
(0.076) 
Average values (per cohort)           
Non-profit    0.025 
(0.092) 
  − 0.010 
(0.030) 
  0.014 
(0.12) 
Cohort size, log    − 0.071 
(0.068) 
  0.00043 
(0.030) 
  − 0.070 
(0.085) 
Cohort size, log 
squared 
  0.0088 
(0.0074) 
  0.00042 
(0.0032) 




  4.0*** 
(1.4) 
  0.48 
(0.37) 
  4.4** 
(1.7) 
Client induced selection    0.13 
(0.39) 
  0.053 
(0.11) 
  0.19 
(0.49) 
             
F-test regional dummies    P = 0.000    P = 0.001    P = 0.000 
F-test: client = provider 
induced selection 
  P = 0.020    P = 0.331    P = 0.033 
             
R-squared    50.4%    20.7%    47.7% 
% variance due to FE  69.5%    44.9%    70.5%   
 
Significance of parameter estimates is denoted by *, **, and *** at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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From the table, it seems that NFP job training service providers (only) make a difference in job 
placements for job contracts that last longer than 12 months. NFPs have a job placement rate for 
durable jobs that is 1.6 to 1.8%-point higher than FPs. For both total job placement rate, 
however, no significant differences are found – at least not for the Mundlak specification.  
 
The estimation results for the job placement model also show that the FE specification gives a 
more pronounced effect for the NFP status than the Mundlak specification does, with cohort 
sizes as relative weights. This particularly holds for the overall job placement rate differential, 
which is significant for the FE model (with 2.6%-point), but smaller and insignificant for the 
Mundlak model (0.54%-point). A possible explanation for this difference is that performance 
differentials are larger for small cohorts – i.e. NFPs have a comparative advantage for small 
cohorts only. Thus, putting more weight on the large cohort decreases the overall differential. 
We return to this issue in the next subsection. 
 
We find limited evidence for client induced selection to affect job placement rates. In particular, 
only for the Mundlak specification client induced selection has a negative and significant 
impact on short term job placement.
8 Similar to the selection model, we also find a hump 
shaped cohort size effect for the FE specification, but no significant effects when using the 
Mundlak specification. Again, these differences can be explained by the use of cohort size as 
relative weights. Finally, we find regional dummies to increase the fit of our model, while there 
is no clear pattern emerging from the yearly dummies. 
  
In order to get more insight in the origins of the obtained performance differentials – both in 
terms of selection and job placement – we re-estimated the Mundlak model for all outcomes of 
interest, while stratifying the observations according to the benefit scheme of the cohort (UI or 
DI) and cohort size (smaller or larger than 100 clients) on the other hand.
9 Table 3.3 presents 
the resulting coefficient estimates for the interaction terms for the job placement models. 
Overall, the table shows no evidence for the NFP-FP differential in job placement rates to be 
confined to a particular contract type. It is only for the differentials in the selection outcomes 
that we find more pronounced results for DI cohorts than for those with UI recipients.
10 One 
explanation for this result may be that fixed payments per client are higher for DI recipients, 
 
8 We also estimated the model without the selection measures as controls. This yielded similar estimates for our parameters 
of interest.  
9 Note that we use the Mundlak specification here, the reasoning being that splitting up the sample in small and large 
cohorts would yield substantially less observations per cohort type, thus decreasing the efficiency of our estimates. In a 
Mundlak setting, however, by assuming that fixed effects do not differ within cohort types (small or large), we can easily 
exploit the panel aspect of the data by the inclusion of averages that are partially based on larger cohorts as well. 
10 Note that the sample averages of the selection measures are of about equal size for the UI and DI cohorts. In particular, 
the averages for provider and client induced selection are 1.6% and 16.7% for UI cohorts, and 2.3 and 17.6% for DI cohorts.   26 
thus creating a larger incentive to bring in these clients at the start of a program. FPs in turn 
may be more susceptive to this incentive, thus increasing both provider and client induced 
selection for DI recipients.  
 
Table 3.3  Estimated NFP-FP differential for Mundlak model, stratified according to benefit scheme (DI/UI) 
and cohort size (</> 100) 
                 Benefit scheme  Cohort size  Overall 
  UI  DI  <100  >99   
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4  Conclusions and discussion 
This paper analyses the relative performance and selection behaviour of NFP job training 
service providers, using unique contract data from the Dutch social benefit administration. In 
our analysis, we take full account of selection effects, both ex ante (i.e. during the contracting 
process) as well as ex post (i.e. at the start of a program). First, given the setup of the 
contracting system, cohort types in our data are ex ante homogeneous − with job service 
training providers only being informed on the average characteristics of the cohort type. Thus, 
there is no room for asymmetric information and selection effects of individual cohorts within 
cohort types. Moreover, the within cohort type variation of individual cohorts in terms of 
performance outcomes of NFP and FP job training service providers is sufficient to obtain 
consistent estimates of performance differentials. Second, selection effects at the start of the 
program is measured explicitly in our analysis. As contracted cohorts are assigned to a specific 
job training service provider, clients that effectively do not participate in the programs are 
labelled as selection effects (or: dropouts) with respect to clients of a particular service 
provider. These effects can be attributed to the job training provider (‘provider induced 
selection’) or individual clients not showing up (‘client induced selection’).  
 
Our estimation results show that FP are more active in selecting clients, both by sending back 
more of them (provider induced selection) and indirectly, by stimulating clients to start a 
program (client induced selection). The higher extent of provider induced selection of FPs 
indicates that they take more advantage of the opportunity to send back clients by excluding 
clients with bad job prospects. This effect is however dominated by the lower rate of client 
induced selection of FPs, causing the fraction of effective participants at the start of the program 
to be lower for NFPs than for FPs. Thus it may well be that FPs are more susceptive to the 
reward incentive per individual client at the start of a program. 
 
Regarding the performance of providers in job placement rates, NFP job training service 
providers make a small difference for the durability of job placements. In particular, we find 
NFPs to have a job placement rate in terms of contracts of at least twelve months that is 1.6 to 
1.8%-point higher than FPs. For the overall job placement rate, however, no significant and 
systematic differences are found.  
 
We conclude that FP and NFP job training service providers have different performance 
outcomes, particularly regarding their selection behaviour. For the social benefit administration, 
however, the conversion from these findings to policy implications is complex. If the contractor 
aims at maximising the fraction of clients that participates in programs as an equity device, FPs 
are to be preferred, as the overall fraction of assigned clients that participates is higher than for 
NFPs. From an efficiency point of view, however, maximising the number of clients that   28 
effectively participates may not be a wise thing to do. Additional clients may be less motivated 
to participate or would have found a job anyhow. Our results indicate some evidence in this 
direction − that is, clients not showing up at the start of a program have higher re-employment 
rates than participants. Given the current setup of our analysis, however, we cannot infer 
whether this finding reflects higher a priori chances to find a job, or whether programs lower 
the probability to find a job. We leave this for future research. 
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